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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Oceans in the Nuclear Age: Legacies and Risks.
Edited by David D. Caron and Harry N.
Scheiber. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,
2010. Pp. xx, 573. Index. $296, E200.
The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant meltdown in Japan, the worst nuclear crisis
since Chernobyl, has at least temporarily brought
to the forefront of public attention some of the
risks associated with nuclear activities. The Japanese government ordered mandatory evacuations
from a wide radius around the plant, and tests
revealed dangerous levels of radioactivity in the
soil, drinking water, milk, vegetables, and beef.
This crisis has affected not only the land territory
and citizens ofJapan but also the marine environment. Contaminated seawater that was used to
cool reactors either leaked or was released into
the ocean, and low-altitude radioactive particles
emitted from the plant have dispersed at sea.
The operation of nuclear plants and waste storage facilities in coastal zones is only one of many
nuclear activities affecting the oceans. Most
nuclear weapons tests have been conducted next
to, over, or under the surface of the oceans;
depleted and reprocessed nuclear fuel is shipped
long distances; nuclear-powered warships carry
nuclear weapons, and both warships and weapons
have on occasion been lost at sea; terrorists may
transport weapons of mass destruction by sea or
attack nuclear vessels; and states have dumped
radioactive waste from ships. The legacy of past
nuclear activities stays with us, perhaps more dramatically than other historic events. Nuclear
material in the oceans remains radioactive, decaying- depending on the element and isotopeover decades, centuries, or millennia.
The Oceans in the NuclearAge highlights incidents and statistics that reveal the magnitude of
nuclear activities affecting the oceans. For over
half a century, France (1966-98), the Soviet
Union (1955-90), and the United States (194658) conducted more than three hundred nuclear
tests underwater, over the oceans, or underground
at island locations. Between 1949 and 1982, thirteen states dumped approximately 150,000 tons
of nuclear waste at forty-seven sites in the Atlantic
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and Pacific. The Soviet Union disposed of significant amounts of radioactive waste in the Arctic
Ocean, often in shallow water; large units, such as
nuclear reactor components, were dumped without the protection of steel containers. A 1993
study commissioned by Russian President Boris
Yeltsin found that the "former Soviet Union
dumped more radioactive waste into the Arctic
Ocean than the total amount of radioactive materials ever dumped into the rest of world's oceans
combined" (pp. 430-31). The legal and policy
challenge is to manage not only ongoing and possible future nuclear uses of the oceans, but the consequences of past activities as well. We most likely
cannot undo those consequences. Removing
nuclear materials from dump and test sites may
not be feasible and could be counterproductive,
leading to consideration of "more modest actions"
including "more active monitoring and mapping,
fishing exclusion zones and public warnings"
(p. 527).
The editors of The Oceans in the NuclearAge,
who are the codirectors of the Law of the Sea Institute, are David Caron, the C. William Maxeiner
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University
of California, Berkeley, and president of the
American Society of International Law; and Harry
Scheiber, the Stefan A. Riesenfeld Professor of
Law and History at the University of California,
Berkeley. As the editors note in the book's introductory part 1, knowledge about the oceans and
about various nuclear-related activities has not
previously been consolidated in one place. This
knowledge has been fragmented among pockets of
specialized experts. This book brings together
valuable historical, environmental, scientific,
political, and legal studies about a variety of
nuclear activities. The Oceans in the Nuclear Age
admirably achieves its goal: it "frame[s] the complex multidimensional set of relationships
between the oceans and the nuclear age, uncovers
patterns of impact and response in the legal
regime, and raises further questions for research"
(p. 3).
The bulk of The Oceans in the Nuclear Age is
organized into four subsequent parts (starting
with part 2), corresponding to different activities.
Part 2, entitled "Radioactive Wastes in the
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Oceans: Managing the Past and Considering the
Future," begins with Hjalmar Thiel examining the
deep-sea impacts of contamination from both
nonvisible sources, such as radiation, and visible
sources, such as dumping (chapter 2). This part
also analyzes the legacy ofnuclear testing (chapters
3-5, by Thomas Leschine, Philip Okney, and
Laurence Cordonnery), the detailed regime regulating hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea
(chapter 6, by Malgosia Fitzmaurice), and the possibility of sub-seabed disposal of high-level radioactive waste (chapters 7-8, by Daniel Fornari and
Edward Miles). In part 3, "The Ocean Transport
of Radioactive Fuel and Waste" (chapters 9-12),
Jon Van Dyke, Luis Rodriguez-Rivera, Masahiro
Miyoshi, and Tullio Treves explore the opposing
political and legal positions of coastal states and
nuclear powers related to such transport. Part 4
concerns "Nuclear Weapons and Weapon Grade
Material on the Oceans." Ted McDorman provides an overview of maritime terrorism and international law concerning the boarding of vessels
(chapter 13), Mark Valencia and Donald Rothwell review the Proliferation Security Initiative'
(chapters 14-15), and Scott Parrish examines
nuclear-weapon-free zones and the maritime transit of nuclear weapons (chapter 17). Craig Allen
and Michael Matheson analyze national strategies
to combat ocean transport of weapons of mass
destruction, concentrating on U.S. security perspectives (chapters 16, 18). Part 5, "NuclearActivities and Radioactive Waste in the Arctic," looks at
transport, dumping, land-based pollution, and
loss of nuclear materials in this particularly fragile
environment. Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel analyzes the
history, law, and politics applicable to the Northwest Passage (chapter 19), while Douglas Brubaker explores the dangers associated with nuclear
transport through the Arctic's Northern Sea
Route (chapter 22). Alexander Skaridov and
Lakshman Guruswamy assess dumping in the Arctic Ocean and the risks posed by decommissioned
Russian nuclear vessels and facilities (chapters
20 -21). In the book's concluding discussion (part

6), Bernard Oxman and Caron reflect on the challenges of the nuclear age for the oceans and on past
and possible responses (chapters 23-24).
Nuclear activities affecting the oceans have provoked intense political controversy, reflecting
strongly held, conflicting values. Shipments of
spent and reprocessed nuclear fuel provide an
example. Miyoshi sets out the traditional legal
position: the high seas freedom of navigation,
which applies in the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), and the regime of innocent passage
through the territorial sea allow such shipments
through the waters of coastal states. Coastal states,
he emphasizes, may only impose conditions recognized in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Convention or Law of the Sea
Convention), 2 such as restricting to sea lanes the
vessels carrying nuclear materials in the territorial
sea. However, shipping cargoes of nuclear waste or
reprocessed fuel presents, in the words of Van
Dyke, "a new challenge to the balance created in
the Law of the Sea Convention between navigational freedoms and protection of coastal communities, coastal resources and the marine environment" (p. 147). Highlighting the duties of flag
states to protect the marine environment and the
risks of an accident or terrorist attack, Van Dyke
notes that coastal states and nongovernmental
organizations have argued that coastal states are
entitled to be notified about, or even to authorize,
shipments of nuclear cargoes through their waters.
The conflicting positions, couched in legal terminology, reflect significant disagreement over
which values deserve priority. One side emphasizes the importance of navigation, commerce,
and energy production, and stresses the dangers to
the established legal order of new unilateral coastal
state assertions of jurisdiction. The other side
focuses on risks to the marine environment,
human health, and the economies of developing
states through whose waters nuclear cargoes are
shipped, and underlines the importance of establishing an adequate liability and compensation
regime. Other nuclear-related ocean activities are

I DEP'T OF STATE, PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE: STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCI-

2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397,
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention
_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm.

PLES, Sept. 4, 2003, availableat http://www.state.gov/
t/isn/c27726.htm.
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also politically sensitive, including proposals to
bury nuclear waste in the deep seabed, efforts to
prohibit nuclear testing, plans to exclude nuclear
weapons and nuclear-powered vessels from certain
waters, and security responses to terrorist threats.
Policymakers need to understand the consequences of past and ongoing nuclear activities to
shape optimum legal responses. The Oceans in the
Nuclear Age advances our understanding of the
historical, environmental, scientific, and political
contexts within which legal solutions must
develop. However, a recurrent theme is the need to
know more about the present and likely future
effects of nuclear activities on the oceans. Several
contributors cite studies indicating that leakage
from nuclear sites has to date had minimal adverse
effects on humans or the marine environment.
But the authors also note that new studies and continual monitoring are needed and that many longterm consequences of nuclear activities affecting
the oceans are uncertain. "[E]ven this far into the
nuclear age," Caron summarizes, "both the possible pathways for radioactive materials to move
within ocean ecosystems and the long term risks of
particularly small doses of radiation remain
unclear" (pp. 516-17). Coastal nuclear installations and submerged radioactive waste may harm
marine ecosystems and human health-for example, when people eat seafood from contaminated
seas-but the extent of such harm and the period
of latency are uncertain. We lack studies measuring leaks in the immediate vicinity of drums of
nuclear wastes, we are not confident about the
extent of environmental consequences when such
containers eventually disintegrate, and we do not
know with certainty when they will leak or disintegrate. "[W]hat can happen to military containers sunk about forty years ago," concludes
Skaridov, "is anyone's guess" (p. 421). In many
instances, we do not even know where to test,
since the precise locations ofmany Soviet and U.S.
dump sites are unknown even to the governments involved. Furthermore, some relevant existing government data have not been made available. To respond appropriately to the environmental and human health consequences of French
nuclear testing in the Pacific, Cordonnery notes
that "scientists need access to the baseline data cur-
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rently held secret by the French government"
(p. 78). The difficulty of reconstructing inventories of radioactive waste compiled by no-longerexisting Soviet agencies poses a "major impediment" to creating a database of generated and
disposed waste, "leaving scientists no choice but to
fumble on by trial and error" (p. 422). The need,
in short, is for more transparency and new studies
about the consequences of nuclear activities.
Perfect knowledge of risks is, of course, not a
prerequisite for international legal responses, and
international environmental lawyers and policymakers have experience structuring regimes to
respond to new and changing information about
risks. Moreover, much is in fact known about the
consequences of releases of radiation. We may not
know the exact mechanisms by which radioactivity migrates from one part of the ocean environment to another, but we have evidence that it does
migrate. While the long-term effects of fallout at a
distance from nuclear tests may be uncertain, it
seems clear that the immediate locations of past
tests "have in effect become waste sites" and need
to be managed accordingly (p. 519). The world
has witnessed devastating human, economic, and
environmental costs of high-level radiation from
nuclear weapons explosions or nuclear plant meltdowns. As Leschine, Okney, and Cordonnery discuss in their chapters on nuclear tests, Pacific atolls
used for testing were evacuated, severely impacting traditional ways of life, injuring people, and
damaging property (and in some cases leading to
damage awards). Weighing the costs and benefits
of nuclear uses of the oceans is difficult-and this
volume appropriately "does not itself undertake to
assess the degree of risk present in [nuclear] activities" (p. 523)-but several contributors forcefully argue that current legal mechanisms have not
sufficiently recognized the risks associated with
nuclear activities. With respect to shipment of
nuclear cargoes, for example, Van Dyke stresses
the need for "a focused and comprehensive legal
regime designed to internalize the real costs of the
shipments, and to ensure that the risks they create
are not transferred from those that benefit from
these shipments to those who gain nothing from
them" (p. 150).

194

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Many contributors to The Oceans in the Nuclear
Age thoughtfully assess past and possible legal solutions and, more broadly, the ways that international law changes to meet new situations. A critical question is whether nuclear activities affecting
the oceans should be banned or, instead, be
allowed to continue (and, if so, under what conditions). Not surprisingly, given the range of issues,
the answers to this question vary. Some treaty
efforts have sought to prohibit certain nuclearrelated activities. For example, test-ban treaties
prohibit states from carrying out nuclear explosions. Dumping, once thought a permissible way
to dispose of low-level radioactive wastes, has been
prohibited under the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (Protocol).' These treaties respond, in
Caron's words, to "the inability of historic customary approaches"-e.g., exercising high seas
freedoms with reasonable regard for the interests
ofother states-"to address the unique position of
nuclear material" (p. 526). The success of such
global prohibitions is, however, incomplete: the
Protocol does not cover military dumping or
dumping in internal waters; the Protocol and testban treaties have not been universally accepted;
state parties face implementation problems; and
rogue states or nonstate actors may flaunt global
bans. One alternative to a global prohibition is to
exclude a risky activity from specified areas, for
example by making it illegal for vessels to enter
particularly sensitive sea areas.' This type ofpartial
prohibition will often not be easy to achieve with
3 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 ILM 1 (1997), availableat
http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/
Multilateral/En/TRE001268.doc. The Protocol is
intended to replace both the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 UST 2403, 1046
UNTS 120, which permitted dumping of low- and
medium-level radioactive wastes in certain circumstances, and a voluntary moratorium introduced in
1983 on such dumping.
4 See International Maritime Organization [IMO],
Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, IMO Doc. A
24/Res. 982 (Dec. 1,2005), availableathttp://www.gc.
noaa.gov/documents/982-1.pdf.
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respect to many nuclear activities on the oceanswitness the debates over whether coastal states
have the right to exclude nuclear weapons from
nuclear-weapons-free zones (explored by Parrish
in chapter 17) or to receive notice about or authorize shipments of nuclear cargoes in coastal waters.
The process of trying to negotiate multilateral prohibitory or exclusionary solutions has at least contributed to increased awareness of the dangers of
certain nuclear activities.
Some of the authors suggest that bilateral or
case-specific measures could help resolve highly
sensitive matters. Elliot-Meisel highlights the
importance of finding pragmatic ways to protect
the Arctic environment and to resolve U.S.-Canadian tensions over Canadian claims concerning
the Northwest Passage. She finds that "precedent
for bilateral and mutually satisfying cooperation
and agreement does exist" (p. 391). In light of the
melting of Arctic sea ice, Canada's difficulty allocating resources necessary to exercise comprehensive control over the North, and U.S. concerns
over continental security, she suggests that conditions may be ripe for a bilateral accommodation.
With respect to the transport of nuclear cargoes,
Treves proposes a procedural mechanism to
resolve particular controversies between coastal
states and the nuclear industry. In his view, aviable
regime "requires conciliation between conflicting
but equally respectable rights" (p. 230). Such a
cooperative procedural approach could, Treves
suggests, lead to case-specific solutions, avoiding
the "need to deal with the question of principle of
which side has the last word" (id.).
Any bilateral initiatives will, however, be undertaken against the background of existing international law, especially the Law of the Sea Convention, and standard setting by international
organizations. With respect to the Arctic Ocean,
Brubaker reports that Norway has implemented
International Maritime Organization (IMO) navigational safety regulations and International
Atomic Energy Agency (LAEA) requirements for
vessel traffic. The United States, Canada, and
other states are also obligated to implement legally
binding IMO standards, and the IMO has
recently been developing measures specifically
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geared to the Arctic. 5 Case-by-case agreements
concerning shipments of nuclear material through
coastal waters, as Treves suggests, might preserve
existing rules of international law, although
common features ofsuch agreements could contribute to assertions of new customary international law.
One important challenge is finding multilateral
solutions within the established framework of the
law of the sea. Were coastal states unilaterally to
prevent shipments of reprocessed nuclear material
through their EEZs, that activity could have significant long-term implications for navigational
mobility, contribute to creeping territorial jurisdiction, and undermine prospects for cooperative
multilateral lawmaking. Oxman notes that "it
makes no sense to prejudice the entire edifice of the
modern law of the sea-and the underlying principles of freedom of navigation and communications through the EEZ and straits on which the
Convention rests-in order to deal with [this]
highly limited problem" (p. 512). Acknowledging
both legal rights of navigation and legal duties
important to environmental protection, Oxman
maintains, should lead us to
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to that problem. We have done this in other
contexts, and we can easily do so here. The
critical point is that the regulations are to be
international, not unilateral, and they are to
be promulgated within the framework of
UNCLOS. (P. 513)

The Law of the Sea Convention, while providing considerable stability and predictability, also
accommodates change. Many alternatives to unilateral measures exist, ranging from new agreements implementing the Convention to IMO
ship safety, navigation, and environmental standards. Detailed treaty-based regimes, consistent
with the Convention, may regulate pollution
risks in regional seas; theworkofthe Helsinki Commission (the governing body of the Convention
on the Protection of the Marine Environment of
the Baltic Sea Area),' which Fitzmaurice explores
in chapter 6, provides one model. The Law of
the Sea Convention also would not constrain
robust liability and compensation regimes covering nuclear-related activities affecting the oceans.
Finding multilateral solutions is complicated
by the fact that nuclear-related activities on the
oceans often implicate legal regimes other than
law of the sea ones: non-proliferation, security
elaborate international standards that must
and self-defense, human rights, and international
be respected by flag states both by virtue of environmental law. The puzzle is how to take
agreement on those standards and by virtue account ofthese other perspectives while still operof the [Law of the Sea] Convention's requireating consistentlywith the Law ofthe Sea Convenment that states exercising freedom of navigation in the EEZ and transit passage of tion. This is a tall order, but it has indeed been posstraits have the duty to comply with generally sible to accommodate law of the sea norms in
accepted international safety and environ- highly politicized contexts relating to nuclear
mental standards. There is no problem what- activities. For example, despite the strains of unisoever in including in such international lateralism evident in the U.S. promotion of the
standards, addressed to the specific problem
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)-a frameof transport of highly radioactive materials,
work to facilitate identifying and interdicting
special obligations and requirements tailored
shipments of material that could be used in weapons of mass destruction-that initiative has been
' See Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters,
IMO Doc. A 26/Res. 1024 Annex (Dec. 2,2009), avail- implemented through agreements that reflect traditional notions of flag state jurisdiction. PSI-speable at http://www.tc.gc.calmedia/documents/marine
safety/IMO PolarGuidelines.pdf; Mandatory Polar cific actions authorizing interdiction operations
Code FurtherDeveloped, IMO NEWS, No. 1, 2011, at
depend on bilateral ship-boarding agreements,
17, available at http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/
NewsMagazine/Documents/IMONewsNol 11
WEB.pdf; see also Arctic Council's Agreement on
Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search
and Rescue in the Arctic, May 12, 2011, available at
http://library.arcticportal.org/1474/1/Arctic
SAR.Agreement ENFINALforsignature_.21-Apr2011.pdf.

6Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Apr. 9, 1992, 2099
UNTS 195, available at http://www.helcom.fil
Convention/enGB/text/. Information about the Helsinki Commission's work is available online at http://
www.helcom.fi/.
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now negotiated with flag states accounting for over
sixty percent of global commercial vessel tonnage.
These ship-boarding agreements, along with other
legal developments related to maritime terrorism,
McDorman concludes, maintain "fidelity with
the basic international legal principle of flag State
consent combined with an enhancement of the
ways in which consent of flag States can be given
and is expected to be given in the face of 'suspected' maritime terrorist activity" (p. 264).
With respect to many oceans-related issues,
international organizations prepare important
studies, devise standards of conduct, and provide
forums for resolving disputes. These international
organizations and existing multilateral arrangements will be essential focal points for efforts to
solve many problems involving nuclear activities.
For example, Guruswamy, in his chapter on Arctic
nuclear pollution, thoughtfully proposes "pragmatic and incremental short term goals" in part
related to such organizations (p. 426). These goals
include authorizing the IAEA to undertake information-gathering functions under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 7 and allowing nongovernmental organizations to participate more actively in the work of
international organizations and other treaty
arrangements.
Although several authors examine aspects of the
work of the IAEA and the IMO, additional
detailed and critical evaluations of the capabilities
and limitations of these and other international
organizations would complement the findings in

The Oceans in the NuclearAge. Important questions concern how organizations, in their work on
nuclear-related activities, affect multilateral treaty
making and standard setting; help shape customary international law; create opportunities for consensus building and contribute to expectations of
cooperative interstate behavior; and facilitate (or
impede) access or participation by nongovernmental organizations. It is also important to con-

joint Convention on the Safety ofSpent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, Sept. 5, 1997, 2153 UNTS 357, available
at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Conventions/jointconv.htmi.
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sider how international organizations that do not
normally focus on maritime issues can best take
account of the Law of the Sea Convention and
other rules ofinternational oceans law and how the
work of various organizations should be coordinated.
While different contributors to the book view
the status quo with varying degrees of concern, the
volume as a whole conveys "a midpoint between
hysteria and denial, between alarm and complacency" (p. 534). But that midpoint suggests that
nuclear activities affecting the oceans-like other
critical problems, such as increased acidity from
greater absorption of carbon dioxide and dead
zones from land-based pollution-have consequences that must be confronted. Finding multilateral solutions that build on current legal norms
and that utilize existing international organizations will not be easy. This volume offers one
clear prescription: the need to conduct more
studies relating to the environmental and health
effects of past and ongoing nuclear activities on the
oceans.
This reviewer hopes that The Oceans in the
Nuclear Age will prompt such scientific studies,
additional legal and policy analyses, and sustained
political efforts to improve regulatory and liability
regimes applicable to nuclear-related oceans activity. As McDorman writes, however, "[d]evelopments in international law frequently follow catastrophic or highly-publicized incidents" (p. 239).
Perhaps the recent Fukushima Daiichi crisis will
spur action concerning land-based pollution and
the safety of nuclear plants in coastal zones, and
even renewed consideration of several of the other
issues surveyed in this book. "Whatever the particular type of incident to occur," Caron concludes, "a significant lesson of international environmental law is that a window of opportunity for
the .. . development of law and policy will open
for a time after such an incident, and that opportunity is best anticipated" (p. 533). The Oceans in
theNuclearAgehelps us anticipate any such opportunity.
JOHN E. NoYES
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